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SOME RESULTS RELATED TO THE CONJECTURE
BY BELFIORE AND SOLÉ
ANNE-MARIA ERNVALL-HYTÖNEN
Abstract. In the first part of the paper, we consider the relation
between kissing number and the secrecy gain. We show that on an
n = 24m+8k-dimensional even unimodular lattice, if the shortest
vector length is ≥ 2m, then as the number of vectors of length
2m decreases, the secrecy gain increases. We will also prove a
similar result on general unimodular lattices. We will also consider
the situations with shorter vectors. Furthermore, assuming the
conjecture by Belfiore and Solé, we will calculate the difference
between inverses of secrecy gains as the number of vectors varies.
We will show by an example that there exist two lattices in the
same dimension with the same shortest vector length and the same
kissing number, but different secrecy gains. Finally, we consider
some cases of a question by Elkies by providing an answer for
a special class of lattices assuming the conjecture of Belfiore and
Solé. We will also get a conditional improvement on some Gaulter’s
results concerning the conjecture.
1. Introduction
Belfiore and Oggier defined in [1] the secrecy gain
χΛ = max
y∈R,0<y
ΘZn(yi)
ΘΛ(yi)
,
where
ΘΛ(z) =
∑
x∈Λ
eπi||x||
2z
as a new lattice invariant to measure how much confusion the eaves-
dropper will experience while the lattice Λ is used in Gaussian wiretap
coding. The function ΞΛ(y) =
ΘZn (yi)
ΘΛ(yi)
is called the secrecy function.
Belfiore and Solé then conjectured in [2] that the secrecy function at-
tains its maximum at y = 1, which would then be the value of the
secrecy gain. Ernvall-Hytönen [12] proved this for all known (and for
some possibly existing) extremal lattices), and derived a method to
prove or disprove the conjecture for any given unimodular lattice. The
secrecy gain was further studied by Oggier, Solé and Belfiore in [16],
where the authors showed, for instance, that the secrecy gain grows
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exponentially with the dimension of the lattice, tied the analysis to the
study of the flatness factor, and gave several examples. and by Lin
and Oggier in [14], where they classified the best codes coming from
unimodular lattices in dimensios 8 ≤ n ≤ 16.
Recently, Lin and Oggier considered unimodular lattices in dimen-
sions up to 23 [13], and furthermore, they considered the dependence
of the secrecy gain on the kissing number K(Λ) of the lattice. They
proved that in dimensions 16 ≤ n ≤ 23, for non-extremal lattices the
secrecy gain is given by
χΛ =
1
1− 2n
26
+ 2n(n−23)+K(Λ)
212
.
In particular, in this case, they proved that the smaller the kissing
number, the better the secrecy gain.
The question whether one can use kissing number to find the best
secrecy gain in general, is not that straightforward to answer: in some
cases, the kissing number determines the secrecy gain, but not always.
We prove that if an even unimodular lattice in dimension n = 24m+
8k (k ∈ {0, 1, 2}) has the shortest vector length ≥ 2m, then the secrecy
gain increases as the number of vectors of length 2m decreases (ie.
when the kissing number decreases, or as a limit case: when there are
no vectors of length 2m but the shortest vector length is 2m + 2, i.e.
the lattice is extremal). In particular, this shows that the secrecy gain
is better on extremal lattices than on lattices with vectors of length
2m. This is done without assuming the conjecture by Belfiore and
Solé. However, assuming the conjecture, we can even calculate how
the secrecy gain varies when the number of shortest vectors varies. We
will also consider the case when the shortest vector length is 2m − 2,
and illustrate why the question is very difficult in the general case.
We will also consider odd lattices: if all vectors are of length at least⌊
n
8
⌋
, then the secrecy gain increases as the number of vectors of length⌊
n
8
⌋
decreases. However, since there are very few lattices satisfying
the condition, this theorem is not as interesting as the one concerning
even lattices. Of course, it would be possible to prove that if all the
vectors are of length ≥
⌊
n
8
⌋
+ 1, then the secrecy gain is better than if
the shortest vector length is
⌊
n
8
⌋
. However, since all the lattices with
shortest vector length
⌊
n
8
⌋
+1 are known, this would not give any new
information past the comparisons in article [13] (see [6] for why there
are very few lattices like this).
After this, we proceed to consider a case where the kissing numbers
are the same but the secrecy gains different. This is done using even
and odd lattices in dimension 40. This should show that in general,
one cannot judge lattices by just looking at the kissing numbers. The
question remains open whether this could be done for just even lattices
(or just odd lattices).
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Finally, we connect the conjecture by Belfiore and Solé and the ques-
tion by Elkies concerning the existence of n − 8k lattices. Namely,
assuming the conjecture, we will show that the dimension of n − 8k
lattices without vectors of length < k is bounded. When k = 3, the
result improves the result by Gaulter [9]. When k ≥ 4, no bounds were
known previously.
2. Preliminaries
For information on theta function, one can study the book [20] by
Stein and Shakarchi. For an extensive source on lattices, one may be
referred to the book [7] by Conway and Sloane. However, to increase
the readability of the current article, we will briefly recall the basic
facts.
Define first the following theta functions:
ϑ2(τ) = e
πiτ/4
∞∏
n=1
(1− q2n)(1 + q2n)(1 + q2n−2)
ϑ3(τ) =
∞∏
n=1
(1− q2n)(1 + q2n−1)2
ϑ4(τ) =
∞∏
n=1
(1− q2n)(1− q2n−1)2,
where q = eπiτ Notice that ϑ3 is the theta function of the lattice Z
n. A
lattice Λ is called unimodular if its determinant = ±1, and the norms
are integral, ie, ||x||2 ∈ Z for all vectors x ∈ Λ. Further, it is called
even, if ||x||2 is even for all x ∈ Λ. Otherwise it is called odd. A lattice
can be even unimodular only if the dimension is divisible by 8. Odd
unimodular lattices exist in all dimensions: Zn is an example of such.
Theta functions of even unimodular lattices in dimension n = 24m+
8k (k ∈ {0, 1, 2}) can be written as polynomials
Θ = E3m+k4 +
m∑
j=1
bjE
3(m−j)+k
4 ∆
j ,
where E4 =
1
2
(ϑ82 + ϑ
8
3 + ϑ
8
4) and ∆ =
1
256
ϑ82ϑ
8
3ϑ
8
4. Here E4 is an Eisen-
stein series, and ∆ the so called discriminant function. For this, and
many other results in the theory of theta functions and lattices, see e.g.
[6].
Generally, theta functions of unimodular lattices in dimension n =
8µ+ ν (ν ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 7}) can be written as polynomials:
ΘΛ =
µ∑
r=0
arϑ
n−8r
3 ∆
r
8,
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where∆8 =
1
16
ϑ42ϑ
4
4. Notice that this gives an alternative representation
for theta functions of even lattices.
We call an even lattice extremal, if the shortest vectors are of length
2m + 2. Earlier, the definition of an extremal lattice stated that a
lattice is extremal if the shortest vectors are of length
⌊
n
8
⌋
+1. However,
Conway, Odlyzko and Sloane were able to show that there are very few
extremal lattices with this definition, and they all exist in dimensions
≤ 24 [6]. Rains and Sloane [18] showed that unless n = 23, the shortest
vector must be 2
⌊
n
24
⌋
+ 2. Furthermore, Gaulter [8] showed that if
24 | n, then any lattice obtaining this bound must be even.
3. Increasing the secrecy gain by decreasing the number
of short vectors
In this section, we will prove two theorems, first of which corresponds
to even lattices, and the second one to all unimodular lattices.
Theorem 1. Let Λ be an even unimodular lattice in the dimension
n = 24m+ 8k with k ∈ {0, 1, 2} with the shortest vector length ≥ 2m.
Let k2m ≥ 0 be the number of vectors of the length 2m. Then the secrecy
gain increases as k2m decreases. Assuming the conjecture by Belfiore
and Solé, the difference between the inverses of the secrecy gains of
two lattices with k2m and k
′
2m vectors of length 2m, respectively, is
(k2m − k
′
2m)
3k
46m+k
.
Notice that the first part of the theorem does not require the conjec-
ture by Belfiore and Solé. That is proved unconditionally. By letting
k2m = 0 in the previous theorem, we have the following special case:
Corollary 2. The secrecy gain of an n-dimensional extremal even uni-
modular lattice, when n = 24m + 8k (k ∈ {0, 1, 2}), is better than the
secrecy gain of any even n-dimensional unimodular lattice with shortest
vector length 2m.
Let us now move to the proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. The theta series of the lattice can be written as a polynomial of
the Eisenstein series E4 and the discriminant function ∆:
Θ = E3m+k4 +
m∑
j=1
bjE
3(m−j)+k
4 ∆
j .
Ernvall-Hytönen showed in [12] that the secrecy gain is the maximal
value of (
(1− z)3m+k +
m∑
j=1
bj
256j
(1− z)3(m−j)+kz2j
)−1
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in the range z ∈
(
0, 1
4
]
. Now we need to find how this expression
changes when the kissing number changes. Write
(1) Eh4∆
j = q2j + ah,j,1q
2j+2 + ah,j,2q
2j+4 + · · · ,
where q = eπi. If the theta function of an even unimodular 24m+ 8k-
dimensional (k ∈ {0, 1, 2}) lattice is of the form
1 + k2mq
2m + · · · ,
then to derive the coefficients bj , we have to solve the following system
of equations:

a3m+k,0,1 + b1 = 0
a3m+k,0,2 + b1a3(m−1)+k,1,1 + b2 = 0
a3m+k,0,3 + b1a3(m−1)+k,1,2 + b2a3(m−2),2,1 + b3 = 0
· · · · · ·
a3m+k,0,m−1 + b1a3(m−1)+k,1,m−2 + · · ·
+bm−2a3+k,m−2,1 + bm−1 = 0
a3m+k,0,m + b1a3(m−1)+k,1,m−1 + · · ·
+bm−1ak,m−1,1 + bm = k2m
From this system of equations, it is clear that b1, b2, · · · , bm−1 depend
only on the coefficients ai,j,h for suitable values of (i, j, h), and not on
the number k2m. We may write
bm = k2m −
(
a3m+k,0,m + b1a3(m−1)+k,1,m−1 + · · ·+ bm−1ak,m−1,1
)
.
Let us now compare the secrecy gains of lattices Λ and Λ′. Assume
k2m > k
′
2m. Denote the corresponding coefficients bj and b
′
j , respec-
tively. Then bj = b
′
j ,when j < m, and
bm − b
′
m = k2m − (a3m+k,0,m + · · ·+ bm−1ak,m−1,1)
− (k2m′ − (a3m+k,0,m + · · ·+ bm−1ak,m−1,1))
= k2m − k
′
2m > 0.
Now the secrecy function of the lattice Λ can be written and estimated
in the following way:
ΞΛ(y) =
ϑn3 (y)
ΘΛ(y)
=
((
1−
ϑ42ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
(y)
)3m+k
+
m∑
j=1
bj
256j
(
1−
ϑ42ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
(y)
)3(m−j)+k
·
(
ϑ42ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
(y)
)2j)−1
<
((
1−
ϑ42ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
(y)
)3m+k
+
m∑
j=1
b′j
256j
(
1−
ϑ42ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
(y)
)3(m−j)+k
·
(
ϑ42ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
(y)
)2j)−1
= ΞΛ′(y),
which proves the first claim.
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Let us now move to the proof of the second claim. Assuming that
the secrecy gain conjecture holds, the secrecy gain is obtained at y =
1. Recall
ϑ42ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
(1) = 1
4
. Now we just need to calculate the difference
Ξ−1Λ (1)− Ξ
−1
Λ′ (1):
Ξ−1Λ (1)− Ξ
−1
Λ′ (1)
=
((
1−
ϑ42ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
(1)
)3m+k
+
m∑
j=1
bj
256j
(
1−
ϑ42ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
(1)
)3(m−j)+k
·
(
ϑ42ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
(1)
)2j)
−
((
1−
ϑ42ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
(1)
)3m+k
+
m∑
j=1
b′j
256j
(
1−
ϑ42ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
(1)
)3(m−j)+k
·
(
ϑ42ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
(1)
)2j)
=
bm − b
′
m
256m
(
1−
ϑ42ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
(1)
)k
·
(
ϑ42ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
(1)
)2m
= (bm − b
′
m)
32m
46m+k
,
and now the proof is complete. 
The cases with shorter and shorter minimal vectors get more and
more complicated: one can not get such a nice dependance. Let us
now state and prove the corresponding theorem in the case where the
shortest vector length is 2m − 2. After that, let us briefly discuss the
difficulties in the general case.
Theorem 3. Assume that even unimodular lattices Λ and Λ′ in dimen-
sion 24m+8k do not have vectors of length < 2m− 2. Let the number
of vectors of length 2m− 2 and 2m be κ2m−2, κ2m, κ
′
2m−2 and κ
′
2m on
lattices Λ and Λ′, respectively. Further assume that κ2m−2 < κ2m. As-
suming the conjecture by Belfiore and Solé, the secrecy gain of lattice
Λ is greater than the secrecy gain of Λ′ if
κ2m − κ
′
2m < (κ2m−2 − κ
′
2m−2)(240k − 24(m− 1)− 12
3).
Proof. Let us study again the system of equations

a3m+k,0,1 + b1 = 0
a3m+k,0,2 + b1a3(m−1)+k,1,1 + b2 = 0
a3m+k,0,3 + b1a3(m−1)+k,1,2 + b2a3(m−2),2,1 + b3 = 0
· · · · · ·
a3m+k,0,m−2 + b1a3(m−1)+k,1,m−3 + · · ·
+bm−3a6+k,m−3,1 + bm−2 = 0
a3m+k,0,m−1 + b1a3(m−1)+k,1,m−2 + · · ·
+bm−2a3+k,m−2,1 + bm−1 = k2m−2
a3m+k,0,m + b1a3(m−1)+k,1,m−1 + · · ·
+bm−1ak,m−1,1 + bm = k2m
Depending on the lattice. k2m = κ2m or κ
′
2m and k2m−2 = κ2m−2 or
κ′2m−2. Furthermore, denote by ci and c
′
i the coefficients corresponding
to the lattices Λ and Λ′, respectively. Now ci = c
′
i for 1 ≤ m− 2,
cm−1 − c
′
m−1 = κ2m−2 − κ
′
2m−2
SOME RESULTS RELATED TO THE CONJECTURE BY BELFIORE AND SOLÉ7
and
cm − c
′
m = κ2m − κ
′
2m − cm−1ak,m−1,1 + c
′
m−1ak,m−1,1.
Hence,
ΘΛ −ΘΛ′ = (κm−1 − κ
′
m−1)E
3+k
4 ∆
m−1+(
κ2m − κ
′
2m − cm−1ak,m−1,1 + c
′
m−1ak,m−1,1
)
Ek4∆
m
= (κm−1−κ
′
m−1)E
3+k
4 ∆
m−1+
(
κ2m − κ
′
2m − (κ2m−2 − κ
′
2m−2)ak,m−1,1
)
Ek4∆
m.
Now, it is clear that the secrecy gain of the lattice Λ is greater than
the secrecy gain of the lattice Λ′ if and only if
min κ2m−2
(1− z)3+kz2(m−1)
256m−1
+ (κ2m− κ2m−2ak,m−1,1)
(1− z)kz2m
256m
< min κ′2m−2
(1− z)3+kz2(m−1)
256m−1
+(κ2m
′−κ′2m−2ak,m−1,1)
(1− z)kz2m
256m
.
Assuming the conjecture by Belfiore and Solé, this is equivalent to
(2)
κ2m−2·3
3+k·4−3−k−2(m−1)−4(m−1)+(κ2m−κ2m−2ak,m−1,1)·3
k·4−k−2m−4m
< κ′2m−2·3
3+k·4−3−k−2(m−1)−4(m−1)+(κ′2m−κ
′
2m−2ak,m−1,1)·3
k·4−k−2m−4m.
From the definition of ak,m−1,1 (see (1)), we obtain
ak,m−1,1 = 240k − 24(m− 1).
Substituting this, and simplifying the inequality (4), we obtain
κ2m − κ
′
2m < (κ2m−2 − κ
′
2m−2)(240k − 24(m− 1)− 12
3),
which proves the claim. 
Let us now discuss the general case. Assuming that the latices do
not have vectors of length < 2ℓ, or that the length of the vectors is the
same, the theta functions differ only by
m∑
j=ℓ
bjE
3(m−j)
4 ∆
j .
Hence, it suffices to consider the behavior of the polynomial
m∑
j=ℓ
bj
256j
(1− z)3(m−j)+kz2j .
To further simplify the problem, let us assume the conjecture by Belfiore
and Solé. This means that we need to consider expressions
m∑
j=ℓ
bj · 3
3(m−j)4−3(m−j)−k−2j−4j
for different lattices. Clearly, it is easy to determine the coefficients
bj for any given lattice. However, in the general case, the expressions for
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coefficients easily become very technical, and it is very difficult to say
anything about their size, for instance, and therefore, it is very difficult
to prove that lattices of certain type must be better than lattices of any
other type. To further illustrate the problem, consider the expression
Eh4∆
j = q2j + ah,j,1q
2j+2 + ah,j,2q
2j+4 + · · · .
First, if j = 0, then Eh4∆
j = Eh4 , i.e. a power of E4. Since
E4 = 1 + 240
∑
n≥1
σ3(n)q
2n,
where σ3(n) =
∑
d|n
d>0
d3, we have
An3 ≤ n3 ≤ σ3(n) ≤ Bn
3
for some constants A and B (see e.g. [19], page 152, Proposition 9), ie.
σ3(n) is approximately of the size n
3, and hence, writing
Eh4 = 1 +
∑
n≥1
f(n)q2n,
we have
f(n) =
∑
ℓ1+ℓ2+···ℓt=n
t≤h
240tσ(ℓ1)σ(ℓ2) · · ·σ(ℓt).
Since all the sigmas are positive, there is no cancellation, and hence,
we may conclude that the values of f(n) get very large. Furthermore,
recall that ∆ is holomorphic cusp form of weight 12, and therefore,
∆jEh4 is a holomorphic cusp form of weight 12j + 4h. Write
∆jEh4 =
∑
n≥j
b(n)q2n.
By Deligne’s result [3], we have |b(n)| ≪ n(12j+4h−1)/2d(n). Of course,
for many values of n, the value of b(n) may be much smaller, although
in general, this bound is good. Furthermore, by Rankin’s result, [17],
there are some positive constants δ1 and δ2 such that
x(log x)−δ1 ≪
x∑
n=1
|τ(n)n−(κ−1)/2| ≪ x(log x)−δ2 ,
where κ is the weight of the form. Hence, in average, the Fourier coeffi-
cients τ(n) of the ∆ function are in average of the size n(11−1)/2(log n)−δ
for some suitable value/values of δ. So, even though there is some can-
cellation, it is pretty clear that the coefficients ah,j,n may get very large
by the estimates above, and therefore, it is very difficult, or perhaps
even impossible to derive any general principles for the dependence of
the secrecy gain on the kissing number, or the number of the short-
est vectors. Of course, one may prove similar theorems to Theorem
3, but one would need much more information or some considerably
more sophisticated methods than the ones presented in this article to
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derive any conclusions whether lattices with greatest kissing numbers
or longest shortest vectors are better than other lattices, for instance.
Finally, let us briefly consider odd lattices. One may prove the fol-
lowing theorem:
Theorem 4. Let Λ be an odd unimodular lattice in the dimension
n with the shortest vector length
⌊
n
8
⌋
. Let the number of vectors of
length
⌊
n
8
⌋
be h. Then, when h decreases, the secrecy gain increases.
Furthermore, assuming the conjecture by Belfiore and Solé, if lattices
Λ and Λ′ have h and h′ vectors of length
⌊
n
8
⌋
, respectively, then the
difference of the inverses of the secrecy gains is h−h
′
45⌊
n
8 ⌋
.
However, since Rains and Sloane [18] have proved that in dimension
n the maximal possible minimal norm is 2
⌊
n
24
⌋
+ 2, also on odd uni-
modular lattices unless n = 23, when the maximal minimal norm is
3, this theorem does not give much information: We can easily derive
from the inequality ⌊n
8
⌋
≤ 2
⌊ n
24
⌋
+ 2
that n ≤ 55 (actually, one could exclude also some other values of
n, either by treating the inequality carefully or by Gaulter’s result [?]
stating that a lattice in dimension 24m meeting the bound 2m+2 must
be even).
Furthermore, one could formulate a similar corollary as in the case of
even lattices. However, since all the lattices with shortest vector length⌊
n
8
⌋
+1 are known, this doesn’t give any new information compared to
[13].
Proof. Since the proof of Theorem 4 is similar to the proof of Theorem
1, we will only sketch the proof to point the differences.
Since the theta function of any unimodular lattice has the polynomial
representation
ΘΛ =
⌊n8 ⌋∑
r=0
arϑ
n−8r
3 ∆
r
8,
writing
ϑr3∆
s
8 = q
s + cr,s,1q
s+1 + cr,s,2q
s+2 + · · · ,
we get the system of equations

a0 = 1
a0cn,0,1 + a1 = 0
· · · · · ·
a0cn,0,⌊n8 ⌋
+ a1cn−8,1,⌊n8 ⌋−1
+ · · ·+ a⌊n8 ⌋
= h.
We may now proceed just like in the proof of the previous theorem. To
prove the second part of the theorem, we work just like in the proof of
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the previous theorem. We use the polynomial expression for the inverse
of the secrecy function:
Ξ−1Λ =
µ∑
r=0
ar
16r
ϑ4r2 ϑ
4r
4
ϑ8r3
and notice that in the difference between the inverses, only the last
terms in the polynomials remain. Their difference is
(h− h′)
16⌊
n
8 ⌋
·
(
ϑ42ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
)⌊n8 ⌋
.
If the conjecture by Belfiore and Solé holds, then the maximum is
obtained at y = 1, i.e.
ϑ42ϑ
4
4
ϑ83
= 1
4
, then the difference becomes
h− h′
45⌊
n
8 ⌋
,
which completes the proof. 
4. Same kissing numbers, different secrecy gains
We will show that the extremal even unimodular lattice in dimen-
sion 40 with shortest vector length 4 and kissing number 39600 has a
different secrecy gain than the odd unimodular lattice in dimension 40
with the same shortest vector length and kissing number. This lattice
is also extremal, in the sense that it has the longest shortest vectors.
It was showed in [12] that the 40-dimensional even unimodular lattice
satisfies the secrecy gain conjecture. Let us use the methods from
there to find the actual value of the secrecy gain. The extremal even
unimodular lattices in dimension 40 have theta series are of the form
1 + 39600q4 + · · · .
The theta function of the lattice can also be written as
E54 − 1200E
2
4∆,
and therefore, the secrecy gain is the maximal value of the function(
(1− z)5 − 75
16
z2(1− z)2
)−1
on the interval
(
0, 1
4
]
, which is obtained at
z = 1
4
, and this value is 4096
297
.
Consider now the odd unimodular lattices in dimension 40 with theta
series of the form
1 + 39600q4 + 1048576q5 + · · · .
More on these odd lattices can be found at [5]. Comparing coefficients,
we see that if the theta function of a unimodular lattice is of the form
1 + 39600q4 + 1048576q5,
then the theta function can be represented as (see [5])
ϑ403 − 80ϑ
32
3 ∆8 + 1360ϑ
24
3 ∆
2
8 − 2560ϑ
16
3 ∆
3
8 + 20480ϑ
8
3∆
4
8.
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Using the method from [12], we’ll see that it is sufficient to show that
the polynomial
1− 5z +
1360
162
z2 −
2560
163
z3 +
20480
164
z4
obtains its minimal value on the interval
(
0, 1
4
]
at z = 1
4
, and then to
compute the inverse of this value.
To show that the polynomial obtains its minimum at z = 1
4
, let us
first differentiate it. The derivative is
5
8
(
2z3 − 3z2 + 17z − 8
)
≤
5
8
(
2z3 + 17z − 8
)
≤
5
8
(
2
64
+
17
4
− 8
)
< 0
on the interval z ∈
(
0, 1
4
]
. Hence, the polynomial obtains its minimum
at z = 1
4
, and this value is 301
4096
. Hence, the secrecy gain is 4096
301
.
5. Connection to n− 8k lattices
The following results are probably mostly of theoretical interest. It
ties together the question of n − 8k-lattices and the conjecture by
Belfiore and Solé. Namely, it is conjectured [4] that the dimension
of n−8k lattices is bounded. In the following, we will first consider the
n−24-lattices, and we have to assume that the lattice has no roots (i.e.
no vectors of norm 1 or 2). Further assuming the conjecture by Belfiore
and Solé, we are able to improve the bound by Gaulter [9] that says
that all the n− 24-lattices without vectors of norm 1, have the dimen-
sion 8388630 or smaller. On the other hand, this result implies that
if there are n − 24 lattices without roots in dimensions n ≤ 8388630,
then the conjecture by Belfiore and Solé fails. The next result is the
general proof that the dimension of n − 8k lattices with no vectors of
length less than k is bounded. This is an improvement of a result by
Gaulter which he shows in his thesis [11], ie. that the dimension of
n − 8k lattices with no vectors of length less than k + 1 is bounded.
Finally, we give some examples, i.e., treat the values of k = 4, 5.
Let us first recall the definition of a characteristic vector, and then
move to the definition of an n− 8k-lattice:
Definition 5. Vector w ∈ Λ (Λ is a lattice) is called a characteristic
vector if
(w, v) ≡ (v, v) (mod 2),
for all v ∈ Λ, where (, ) is the inner product
Definition 6. Lattice is called en n− 8k-lattice if all its characteristic
vectors are of length at least n− 8k.
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Elkies proved that all n-lattices must be of form Zℓ⊕Λ [?]. Also n−8
and n− 16 lattices are well-known. For a brief history and recollection
of results, see e.g. [10].
Theorem 7. If the conjecture by Belfiore and Solé holds, then there
are no n − 24-lattices in dimensions 23171 ≤ n ≤ 8388630 without
roots, ie. without vectors of length 1 or 2.
Proof. We are going to use the method from [9]. First recall (for the
argument, see e.g. [15], Section 2) that the theta series of an n − 24
lattice may can be written as
(3) ϑn3 + Aϑ
n−8
3 ∆8 +Bϑ
n−16
3 ∆
2 + Cϑn−243 ∆
3.
We since the lattice has no roots, we have A = −2n and B = 2n2−46n.
Next we need some bounds for the value of C. Consider the secrecy
function (
1−
2n
16
z +
2n2 − 46n
162
z2 +
C
163
z3
)−1
.
First of all, as a ratio of theta functions, the secrecy function must be
positive. Hence, in particular,
1−
2n
16
·
1
4
+
2n2 − 46n
162
·
1
42
+
C
163
·
1
43
> 0,
and hence,
C > −643 + 2n · 642 − 64(2n2 − 46) = −128n2 + 64 · 175n− 643.
On the other hand, if the conjecture by Belfiore and Sole holds, it is
clear that the value of the secrecy function at z = 1
4
must be at least
as large as the value of the secrecy function at z = 0. Hence,
1−
2n
16
·
1
4
+
2n2 − 46n
162
·
1
42
+
C
163
·
1
43
≤ 1.
Hence,
C ≤ −128n2 + 174n.
We obtain C = −128n2 + 174n − h with h ∈ [0,−643[. Gaulter [9],
Corollary 3.3 has proved the following result:
Lemma 8. The number of shortest characteristic vectors of a positive
definite unimodular Z-lattice of dimension n is at most 2n.
Furthermore, he has proved that
(4) |χn−8k| = λℓ2
n−8k,
where n−8k is the length of the shortest characteristic vectors, χn−8k is
the number of vectors of that length, and λℓ is defined in the following
way: The theta-function of the lattice is written as a polynomial
⌊n8 ⌋∑
ℓ=0
λℓϑ
n−ℓ
3 E
ℓ
4.
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Since
∆8 =
1
16
(
ϑ83 − E4
)
,
we may replace the polynomial representation (3) by the following rep-
resentation:
ϑn3 + Aϑ
n−8
3 ∆8 +Bϑ
n−16
3 ∆
2 + Cϑn−243 ∆
3
= ϑn3 +
A
16
ϑn−83 (ϑ
8
3 −E4) +
B
162
(
ϑ83 − E4
)2
+
C
16
(
ϑ83 −E4
)3
.
From this we obtain λ3 = −
C
163
. By (4) and Lemma 8, we have
2n ≥ |χn−24| = −
C
163
· 2n−24,
and hence
236 ≥ 128n2 − 174n+ h,
and in particular,
236 ≥ 128n2 − 174n,
and hence,
n ≤ 23171.

Theorem 9. If the conjecture by Belfiore and Solé holds, then the
dimension n of n−8k lattices with no vectors shorter than k is bounded,
ie. for any k there is an Nk such that there are no n − 8k lattices in
dimensions n > Nk.
Proof. The theta function of the lattice can be written as
ϑn3 +
k∑
ℓ=1
bℓϑ
n−8ℓ
3 ∆
ℓ
8.
The coefficients bℓ for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k − 1 are determined by the fact that
there are no vectors of corresponding length. Furthermore, looking at
the equations that determine the coefficients

cn,0,1 + b1 = 0
cn,0,2 + b1cn−8,1,1 + b2 = 0
· · · · · ·
cn,0,k−1 + b1cn−8,1,k−2 + · · ·+ bk−1 = 0.
Furthermore, notice that the coefficients cℓ,j,h are polynomials in n.
Clearly, they can be exponential in j and h, but since we are interested
in asymptotics in n, and hence we may assume k to be a constant, and
now also j and h can be treated as constants, or being below some
constant bound, the dependence on n is polynomial.
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Consider now the inequalities
1−
k∑
ℓ=1
bℓ
16ℓ
·
1
4ℓ
> 0
(positivity of the theta function) and
1−
k∑
ℓ=1
bℓ
16ℓ
·
1
4ℓ
≤ 1
(follows from the conjecture by Belfiore and Solé). From these we see
that also bk must be polynomial in n.
Use now again Gaulter’s results stating that the number of shortest
characteristic vectors is at most 2n, and (4). We need value of λk. By
substituting ∆8 =
1
16
(ϑ83 −E4), we have
λk = ±
bk
16k
,
and hence, also λk is polynomial in n. Finally, consider the equation
(4)
χn−8k = λk2
n−8k.
If λk is negative for values of n > Mk for some Mk, then this equation
can not hold: the number of vectors cannot be negative, and then we
may choose Nk = Mk. On the other hand, if λk, is positive, and it’s
polynomial, then it’s increasing. However, we have
2n ≥ λk2
n−8k,
ie.
28k+4k ≥ |bk|,
which is a contradiction: polynomials are not bounded. 
Theorem 10. Assume the Belfiore Solé conjecture. Then there are no
n− 32 lattices without vectors of norm ≤ 3 in dimensions ≥ 14941.
Proof. We proceed precisely as in the proof of the previous (general)
theorem. The theta function of the lattice can be written as
ϑn +
4∑
ℓ=1
bℓϑ
n−8ℓ∆ℓ8
with
b1 = −2n
b2 = 2n
2 − 46n
b3 = −
4
3
+ 92n2 −
4832
3
n.
Hence
b4 = 64
3 · 2n− 642(2n2 − 46n) + 64
(
4
3
n3 − 92n2 +
4832
3
n
)
− s
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with s ∈ [0, 644[. Now
λ4 =
b4
164
.
For any lattice, the following inequality must hold
2n ≥ λ42
n−32,
ie.
248 ≥ 643 · 2n− 642(2n2 − 46n) + 64
(
4
3
n3 − 92n2 +
4832
3
n
)
− s
This holds only when n ≤ 14940. 
Theorem 11. Assume the Belfiore Solé conjecture. Then there are no
n− 40 lattices without vectors of norm ≤ 3 in dimensions ≥ 12885.
Proof. We proceed precisely as in the proof of the previous (general)
theorem. The theta function of the lattice can be written as
ϑn +
5∑
ℓ=1
bℓϑ
n−8ℓ∆ℓ8
with
b1 = −2n
b2 = 2n
2 − 46n
b3 = −
4
3
+ 92n2 −
4832
3
n
b4 =
2
3
n4 − 84n3 +
12430
3
n2 − 66542n.
Hence
b5 = 64
4 · 2n− 643(2n2 − 46n) + 642
(
4
3
n3 − 92n2 +
4832
3
n
)
− 64
(
2
3
n4 − 84n3 +
12430
3
n2 − 66542n
)
− s
with s ∈ [0, 645[. Now λ5 = −
b5
165
Again, the following inequality must
hold
2n ≥ λ52
n−40,
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i.e.
260 ≥ −b5 = −64
4 ·2n+643(2n2−46n)−642
(
4
3
n3 − 92n2 +
4832
3
n
)
+ 64
(
2
3
n4 − 84n3 +
12430
3
n2 − 66542n
)
+ s
≥ −644 · 2n+ 643(2n2 − 46n)− 642
(
4
3
n3 − 92n2 +
4832
3
n
)
+ 64
(
2
3
n4 − 84n3 +
12430
3
n2 − 66542n
)
.
We get n ≤ 12884. 
6. Conclusions
Clearly, there is a dependence between the kissing number and the
secrecy gain in some cases, but in the general case, there is not. Of
course, it would be interesting to see, whether there would be a depen-
dence in the general case, if the consideration were limited to only even
or odd unimodular lattices. Secondly, the conjecture by Belfiore and
Solé can be used to solve a question by Elkies in some special cases,
namely, when the shortest vectors of an n−8k lattice are of the length
k.
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